Though late Paleolithic in standard periodization, to identify one versus another as explaining war, bethese people had been experimenting with wild crop cause they all are involved, non-reductionistically, harvesting thousands of years before the developstamped into our species' mind by their complemenment of agriculture elsewhere. This experiment was tary contributions to our evolutionary success.
brought to a crashing halt by climatic change which In approaching war, he avoids the more dubious would have put extreme pressure on all peoples evolutionary constructs, such as ''instincts to kill '' throughout the region, especially those in favorable (Ghiglieri 1999: 178) , ''Darwinian algorithms'' for locales like Site 117 (Hoffman 1993: 86-90) . collective aggression (Tooby and Cosmides 1988) , Northern Australia, a favorite illustration for and unconscious tracking of reproductive advantages Gat, is a unique area in terms of the depth and conof violence (Chagnon 1979; 1987) . I do not know tinuity of collective violence among mobile hunterhow he categorizes his approach, but in emphasizing gatherers, with rock art images suggesting individual material self-interest and behavioral plasticity, along and small group combats from about 8,000 B.C., with directed efforts to maximize inclusive fitness, it and larger group confrontations beginning about appears to me as a development of evolutionary 4,000 B.C. (Tacon and Chippindale 1994) . This was ecology. Evolutionary ecology has a great deal of a time of massive ecological crisis, with rising sea overlap with ecological approaches that do not inlevels drowning the rich plain that once connected clude reproductive interests. So Gat's view (Part II:
Australia to New Guinea. Socially, we see signs of 79) of reasons for war on the Pacific Northwest increasing complexity and cultural divisions (Jones Coast is much like my (Ferguson 1984a) pre-contact and Bowler 1980:23; Schrire 1982: 7; Tacon and model, though he brings in evidence of women capChippindale 1994: 217, 224, 227) . Why war became ture which, as he notes (I: 28), I ignore. And there such an institutionalized pattern is suggested by hisare major correspondences with the Divale and Hartoric observations: their reliance on water holes in ris (1976) model regarding female scarcity and fightdry seasons, sources that sometimes disappear in ing over women, although without the populationdroughts, gave them an extremely concentrated and regulation element. The primary difference between valuable resource to fight over (Meggitt 1962: 24, evolutionary ecology and ''regular'' (Chapman 1999:140; Dolkhanov ing to optimal foraging theory-itself closely associ-1999: 77; Vencl 1999: 58) . Summarizing information ated with evolutionary ecology-open networks and for early prehistoric North America, Haas (1999: 14) sharing is often the most rational strategy, especially concludes:
when resources are patchy and unpredictable. Which applied more, where, and when in our past, is any- eas, people deal with violent conflict by moving away, or in with someone else (Ferguson 1995: 47) , So it is around the world: the multiple archaeologia pattern found throughout Amazonia (1989: 196) . cal indicators of war are absent until the developSuch simple ecological explanations of war ment of a more sedentary existence and/or increasing were advanced in the 1960s, and generally abansociopolitical complexity, usually in combination doned with greater scrutiny. The volume Warfare, with some form of ecological crisis and/or steep Culture, and Environment (Ferguson 1984b ) was a ecological gradients. Then, signs of war become recognition of this, and an effort to keep ecological multiple and unambiguous (Carman and Harding considerations viable by recognizing the greater 1999; Ferguson 1997, n.d.; Haas n.d.; Milner 1995;  complexity of their role in war. Most ecologically Roper 1975). This is not to suggest that war never minded analysts still are interested in possible relahappened in more ancient hunter-gatherer times, but tionship between growing populations and conflict, the global pattern of actual evidence indicates that but the data just does not support a direct associawar as a regular pattern is a relatively recent develtion of increasing density and increasing war (Keeopment in human history, emerging as our ancestors ley 1996: 118-120). The statistical research of Carol left the simple, mobile hunter-gatherer phase.
and Melvin Ember, which earlier dispelled the War developed in more places and diffused out-''myth of the peaceful hunter-gatherer,'' (C. Ember ward as time went on, even to simple hunter-1978) found that chronic, ordinary resource scarcity gatherers. But there is good reason to wonder if the was not a significant predictor of war (Ember and high casualty rates reported, as for northern AustraEmber 1992) . When you get down to cases, Yalia in the decades before anthropological visitation nomami (and other Amazonian) warfare cannot be and description, had not been impacted by ''warrifyexplained as a result of conflicts over game (Ferguing'' tribal zone effects (Ferguson 1990a; Ferguson son 1989; 1995: 343-353) . and Whitehead 2000). Certainly, the early contact More problems are brought in with sociobioexperience of Northern Australia (Cole 1975; Meg- logical concepts related to the pursuit of reproducgitt 1962) is of the type that generated more war in tive success. The endlessly repeated idea that it is in other parts of the world. Such high levels of killing male's genetic interest to spread those genes around, might be due to purely local causes, but that should whereas women seek to snag and hold one male not be assumed to be so without investigation of other possibilities. That is precisely the error that triprovider-though asserted with relative caution by bal zone theory is intended to address.
Gat (I: 27)-disregards one tremendously salient fact: to procreate, a man must eat. Unlike other aniHaving posited the widespread existence of war mals, for humans that requires being an accepted among prehistoric hunter-gatherers, Gat sets out to member of a cooperative group of food producers. explain it. His ecological arguments also rest on Any behavioral proclivity that interfered with that questionable assumptions. Although Gat's (I: Wolf 1987 ). An evolutionary perspective thus one's immediate group could endanger acceptance provides only an ex post facto explanation of a wellwithin the group and the solidarity of the group itknown phenomenon, explainable without reference self. It would compete with other men who are close to reproductive striving. But more importantly here, genetic relatives or potential ''wife givers''-thus does conflict over women offer an explanation of going against kin selection and reciprocal altruism. war comparable to conflict over material issues? Gat Plus, as Gat emphasizes (I: 27), one of the main reasays, ''I think this question is in fact pointless. It arsons for violence and killing is sexual affairs, and tificially isolates one element from the wholeness of there is nothing like being dead for cutting down on the human motivational complex that may lead to lifetime reproductive success. Thus it is by no means war'' (I: 27). But the question is hardly pointless. self-evident that the putative male reproductive stratWhether warfare among Yanomami, for instance, is egy would, on average over thousands of generaover women, game, or Western manufactures leads tions, increase rather than curtail genetic success.
to an entirely different set of expectations and proofs-and totally different understandings of the Gat (I: 27) follows the neo-Darwinian (see Buss reality of their war. In my analysis of actual cases, 2000) line in explaining why women have affairs as conflict over women among Yanomami, though ceran effort to get additional male support, or lay in tainly prominent, is not an independent cause of war ''insurance'' against future loss of their husbands. (Ferguson 1995: 355-358 ), but one manifestation of Why would women need insurance, if men are so relationships that are severely strained by antagoniseager to add another mate? Is there any evidence tic interests regarding exogenous trade goods. from tribal societies that widows go to men with whom they have had affairs? If males are innately It is in this inclusive frame that Gat (II) disjealous about paternity, and predisposed to violence cusses a range of secondary reasons for war, considand even killing at any suspicion of infidelity (as erations of status, revenge, power, insecurity, the suBuss especially emphasizes), extra support from a pernatural, cannibalism, play. True enough, such lover would have to be so limited as to be unnoticefactors are clearly involved in processes leading to able by a wary husband. Is it likely that such limited war in many situations. I too see many of them as benefits outweigh the costs of being beaten or killed, part of an integrated motivational complex, but in a regularly over thousands of generations? very different light than Gat. Rather than separate Gat (I: 31) also invokes what Wilson and Daly traits, each capable of leading to war, joined by (1985) call the ''young male syndrome,'' the intuicommon selective advantage in an imagined past, I tively reasonable proposal that young unmarried see them as part of holistic relations between social men, peaking at twenty-five, are most prone to viogroups in the present, with ideas of status, revenge, lence because in an evolutionary perspective such witchcraft, etc. brought into play in ways structured risk taking may be most crucial for their reproducby underlying material interests (Ferguson 2000 : tive success. But Napoleon . By claiming these all should be seen as dict this idea, demonstrating that among Yanomami, equally valid explanations of war, because of their a maximum of 5 out of 83 men under 25 years old assumed evolutionary advantages, Gat side-steps the (1988:989), and possibly none of them (1990: 50 main issues in the anthropology of war, which is, n.1), have participated in a killing. Moreover, Chawhat factors or conditions explain why people fight? gnon (1968: 115, 129-130) reports that young men His answer seems to be, ''they all do.'' This renders are among the least willing to engage in risky physihis theory irrelevant to efforts to explain variations cal violence. Among Yanomami, killers are generally in war. If in an evolutionary perspective, the quesmiddle-aged married men with children. Logical and tion of what factors best explain the occurrence of empirical problems such as these abound in the sexwar is ''pointless,'' does that not make an evolutionual selection models of neo-Darwinian thought.
ary perspective 'pointless' for those who think the question is important? Gat (I: 27-29) makes a good case that conflict over and capture of women plays an important role
In anchoring explanation in an unknowable in many reported cases of warfare. Many have compast, the theory becomes unfalsifiable. If some fremented before on the prominence of fighting over quently noted reason for war does not contribute diwomen in simpler societies, including authors quite rectly to reproductive or somatic success, then it endistant from sociobiology (for example, Collier and hances social status, which itself contributes to such success. If that cannot be posited, then it is a ' 'mal1984c: 37-39; 1990b: 29-31 (1979: 62-63) and myself posited a limited number In discussing prisoner's dilemmas and related of evolved psychological propensities oriented toideas, Gat (II: 78-79) lets game theory run away ward maintaining material well-being. Combined with him. Yes, such logic of insecurity is definitely a with other elemental, uncontroversial dimensions of factor, but heavily tempered by other considerations.
human nature-such as a sex drive, a desire to be Take the Yanomami, about whom he quotes E.O.
esteemed by others, an ability to bond with young, Wilson on their inability to stop fighting. But Yabehavioral flexibility, reliance on learning, and the nomami, in practice, do end their wars. Active fightcapacity for cooperation-taking care of material ing between two groups rarely if ever lasts more well-being (rather than doing whatever culture tells than two years, lingering hostilities and suspicions you to do, or being directed by a multitude of Darnotwithstanding (Ferguson 1995: 47-48) . It is signifiwinian predispositions) can account for the spectacucant how light this extended discussion is on ethnolar evolutionary success of our species. But Gat is graphic citations, relying critically on two realist thecorrect that we did not speculate on how these basic orists writing on recent global international relations.
psychological orientations evolved. Speaking for myOne could take this as an effort to naturalize the reself, on the topic of war, that seemed far less imporalist paradigm, making arms races as natural as tree tant than formulating and testing hypothesis about trunks (II: 79). Structural realism is heavily critithe causes of war in the present. cized in international relations theory today. Does it For others, such as Gat, that is not enough. make sense to uncritically import it into They seek an ultimate answer for war, one that foreanthropology?
grounds the fact that human beings are animals, that To summarize, I have four main areas of disaour species' behavioral capacities did come into begreement with Gat. First, available evidence contraing via natural selection. In Gat's work I see a posdicts the assumption that warfare was a regular part sibility of developing common ground between the of our ancestral environment of evolutionary adaptwo interests. His theory does not need to posit war tion. Second, simple population-to-resources ecologithroughout our hunter-gatherer past. Most or all of cal explanations of war such as Gat suggests have the behavioral predispositions he proposes are much been investigated in ethnographically known sociebroader in significance than the restricted area of ties, and generally disconfirmed (although more group conflict, and could evolve without it. We complicated and situationally limited ecological exshare a similar perspective on the importance of maplanations are supported). Third, the common neoterial goals. If he would put more emphasis on the Darwinian hypotheses on reproductively motivated proximate goal of sexuality without a reproductive behavior suffer from serious logical and empirical calculus, on his point that ''people widely desire deficiencies. Fourth, I would put material selflove and sex for their own sake'' (II: 75), we would interest as superordinate to any and all the other mobe close to agreement there. I do accept that many tives Gat discusses as a general, primary reason beof the ''second floor'' factors he discusses are reahind war. That last point requires some elaboration, sons for war, which though structured by material which in the end may establish substantial common concerns do have some autonomy and independent ground between Gat and myself. explanatory value. I see no reason Gat should object Early in his argument Gat (I: 21) criticizes culto the proposition that how explanatory any or all of tural materialists for taking the motive of material them are for explaining war is a significant question gain as simply a fact of life. Some history is needed for empirical investigation. How acceptable any of here. Material goals in war were posited as part of a this will be to Gat I cannot predict. But regardless general shift from systemic to actor-based models, of his reaction, I believe this article has advanced and against the dominant orientation that people will the possibility of dialogue between materialist and fight for whatever culture tells them to (Ferguson evolutionary explanations of war.
